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Abstract
In this paper I will discuss the properties of the Algorithmic Complexity, pre-
senting the most relevant properties. The related concept of logical depth is also
introduced. These properties will be used to study the problem of learning from ex-
ample, paying a special attention to machine learning. We introduce the propensity
of a machine to learn a rule and we use it define the intelligence of a machine.
1 Algorithmic Complexity
We have already seen in the chapter [. . . ] that Kolmogorov, independently from and
more less simultaneously with other peoples, introduced the concept of algorithmic
complexity of a string of character (or if we prefer of an integer number)as the length
in bits of the shortest message that is needed to identify such a number. This look
similar to Shannon’s entropy, but it is deeply different. Shannon’s entropy is the
shortest length of the message needed to transmit a generic string of characters
belonging to a given ensemble, for example a sentence of given length in Italian.
Kolmogorov complexity is is the shortest length of the message needed to transmit
a given string of characters.
In a slightly different setting, that is nowadays more familiar to most of us, we
can define the Kolmogorov complexity Σ(N) of a number N as the length of the
shortest computer program that computes such a number (or if we prefer prints that
number). This definition of complexity depends on the computer language in which
the program is written, so that we should indicate in the definition of Σ(N) the
language we are using. However if we are interested to large values of complexity the
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choice of the language is irrelevant and it contributes in the worst case to constant.
It is evident that
ΣPascal(N) < ΣPascal(Fortran compiler written in Pascal) + ΣFortran(N) (1)
Indeed if we know how to compute something in Fortran and we would like to compute
it in Pascal, we can just write a Fortran compiler in Pascal and use it to execute the
Fortran code. In the nutshell we can transmit the Fortran compiler written in Pascal
and the program that computes the message in Fortran. Inverting the argument we
get
|ΣFortran(N)− ΣPascal(N)| < const (2)
where constant does not depend on N . So for real complex messages the choice of
the language is not important.
This is common experience also in human languages. If we are going to have a
short discussion on the possible evolution of the snow conditions in the next days in
relation to a trip on a dog-trained sled, it is extremely likely that the conversation
should be much shorter is some languages and much longer in other ones. On the
contrary, if we have to explain to somebody the proof of the last Fermat theorem
starting from scratch (i.e. from elementary arithmetics), it would take years and in
the process we can introduce (or invent) the appropriate mathematical language, so
that the dependence on the natural language we use is rather weak. In other words for
messages of small complexity we can profit of the amount of information contained in
the language, but this help becomes irrelevant in the case of very complex messages.
It should be clear that in the case of a generic number N of K binary digits, e.g.
smaller that 2K elementary arguments (and also Shannon’s theorem) tell us that the
complexity is K. The complexity cannot be larger than K because we can always
write a program that is of length K plus a small constant:
write 3178216741756235135123939018297137213617617991101654611661
The length of this program is the same as the length of the output of the program
(apart for the characters lost in writing “write”) and it rather likely (I will pay 1000
Euros for a counterexample) that there is no much shorter one 1. Of course the
program
write 11**57
is much shorter that
write 228761562390246506066453264733492693192365450838991802120171
1I beg the reader to forget the inefficiency of writing decimal numbers in ASCI.
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although they have the same output.
Let us consider an other example. The program
A=2**31-1
B=5**7
I=1
for K=1 to A-1
I=mod(I*B,A)
endfor
generates a sequence of pseudo random numbers that is rather long (about 8 Gbytes)
and apart form small variations it is extremely likely that it is the shortest program
that generate it. Of course it is much shorter of the program (of 8 Gbytes of length)
that explicitly contains the sequence.
2 Some properties of complexity and some ap-
parent paradoxes
Although most of the numbers of K bits have complexity K, we have seen that there
are notable exceptions. It should be clear that to identify these exceptions and to
evaluate of the complexity is not a simple task. A number may have a low complexity
because it is a power, or because it is obtained as the iteration of a simple formula, or
just because it coincides with the second millions of digits of pi. A systematic search
of these exceptions is not easy.
However one could imagine a simple strategy. We can consider all the programs
of length K. Each program will stop and will write a string (maybe empty) or it will
never stop: A program that never stops is
I=1
do forever
I=I+1
if(I<0) then
write I
stop
endif
enddo
where I is an arbitrary length number.
In this case is trivial to show that the program stops. In other cases is much
difficult to decide if the programs stops. Let us consider the following example:
3
I=1
do forever
I=I+1
consider all postive integers a,b,c and n, less than I with n>2.
if(a**n+b**n=c**n) then
write a,b,c,n
stop
endif
enddo
This program stops if and only if Fermat last theorem is false and we know now
that it will never stops. Up to a few years ago it was possible that it would stop
writing a gigantic number. A program that stops only if the Goldbach conjecture is
false quite like will never stop, but we do not know for sure.
There cannot be any computer program that can compute if a computer program
stops or not. Otherwise we would have a contradiction. A computer program would
be able to find out those programs who stops, identifies those program that are the
shortest one and produce the same output: for given length we can sort them in
lexicographic order. If this happens, for example wee could identify the first program
of length K of this list. The output of this program has complexity K, in the same
way as all the programs of this list, however we would identify the first program of
the list transmitting only the number K; this can be done using only ln2(K) bits and
therefore the complexity of the output would be ln2(K), i.e. a number much smaller
than K and this is a contradiction.
One could try to find out a loophole in the argument. Although it is impossible
to decide if a program does not stop, because we would need to run it for an infinite
amount of time, however we can decide if a program stops in M steps. As far as
there is a finite number of programs of length K for each value of K we can define a
function f(K) that is equal to the largest value of steps where a program of length
K stops. All programs that do not stop in f(K) must runs forever. The previous
construction could be done by checking the output of all the program of length less
than f(K). Therefore if we could compute the function f(K) or an upper bound to
it, we would be able to get the list of all the program that stops.
A simple analysis show that no contradiction is present if we the function f(K)
increases faster than any function that is computable with a program of constant
length: e.g. we must have that for large K that
f(K) > ee
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
K
(3)
The complexity of finding an upper bound to f(K) must be O(K).
4
The existence of a function that grows faster than what can be computed by a
program of fixed length seems surprising however it is rather natural. Indeed if we
call M(K) the maximum finite number that can be printed by a program of length
K. Now it is evident that M(K + 1) > M(K), therefore the function M(K) cannot
be printed by any program with length less that K, so that there is no finite length
program that is able to print all the values of M(K). The conclusion is that to
find the shortest program (or if we prefer the shorted description) of a number N is
something that cannot be done by program: the complexity is a well defined quantity,
but it cannot be computed systematically by a program.
Many variations on the same theme can be done: suppose that we add to our
computer an oracle: a specialized hardware that that tells the value of f(K)) (or
directly the complexity of a string). We could now define a complexity Σ1(N) for the
system computer +oracle. The same argument as before tell us that the new com-
plexity Σ1(N) cannot be computed for any N by the the system computer +oracle.
We could introduce a superoracle and so on. The fact that we are unable, also with
the use of any kind of oracles, to find a systems that can compute the computational
complexity relative to itself recalls intuitively the Godel theorems: This is not a sur-
prise as far there are deep relations among these arguments and with Godel theorems
that have been investigated by Chaitin and presented also in many popular papers.
3 The logical depth
The problem of finding out the minimal complexity of a number (or of a sequence
of numbers), intuitively correspond to finding the rule according that some number
have been generated. This problem is used in intelligence tests. For example one may
be asked to find out the rules that generate the following sequences or equivalently
to predict the next numbers of the sequences
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048
1 1 2 3 5 8 13 21 34 55 89 144
1 1 2 2 4 2 4 2 4 6 2 6 4 2 4 6 6 2 6 4 2 6 4 6 8 4 2 4
For the first two lines the rule is clear, the third line is a Fibonacci sequence: the
next number is the sum of the of the two previous one, while the last line follow a
slightly more complex rule and we leave to the reader the pleasure to find it.
In the case that there are different rules, we consider a natural rule the simplest
one: for example we could say that the first line is the sequence of natural integer
that cannot be written as a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 with a, b c and d are all different (the
first integer missing would be 30). However this second rule is much longer and it is
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unnatural. The two rules would produce rather different sequences but if we know
only the first elements the fist choice is much more natural
A related and somewhat complementary concept is the logical depth of a number
[?]: roughly speaking it is the amount of CPU needed to compute it if we use the
shortest program that generates it (i.e. the natural definition of the number).
It is evident that if the complexity is given by the upper bound and the program
consists of only one write instruction, the execution is very fast. i.e. linear in the
number of bits. On the contrary, if a very short program prints a very long sequence,
the execution may be still very fast, as in the case of a typical random number
generator, or may be very slow, e.g. the computation of the first 106 digits of pi or
to find out the solution of an NP hard problem whose instance has been generated
using a simple formula. Only a low complexity sequence may have a large logical
depth; moreover the same arguments of the previous section tell us that there must
be for any value of the complexity K sequences with extremely large values of the
logical depth (i.e. of order f(K).
These results concern us also because science aims to find out the simplest for-
mulation of the law that reproduce the empirical data. The problem of finding the
simplest description of a complicated set of data correspond to find the scientific
laws of the world. For example both the Newton and the Maxwell laws summarize
an enormous quantity of empirical data and are likely the shortest description of
them. The ability of finding the shortest description is something that cannot be
done in general by a computer and and it is often taken a sign of intelligence.
Phenomenological explanations with lot of parameters and no so deep theory are
often easy to apply and correspond to rules that have high complexity and low logical
depth while simple explanations with few parameter and lot of computation needed
have low complexity and rather high logical depths.
For example the computation of chemical properties using the valence theory and
the table of electronegativity of the various element belongs to the fists class, while
a first principle computation, starting from basic formulae, i.e. quantum mechanics
belongs to the second class. A good scientific explanation is a low complexity theory
(i.e. the minimal description of the data) that unfortunately may have an extremely
large logical depth. Sometimes this leads to the use of approximated theories with
higher complexity and smaller logical depth.
4 Learning form examples
Scientific learning is just one case of a general phenomenon: we are able to lear from
example and to classify the multitude of external object into different classes. The
problem of how it is possible to learn from examples has fascinated thinkers for a
6
long time. In the nutshell the difficulty is the following: if the rule cannot be logically
derived from the examples 2 how do we find the rule? The solution put forward by
Plato was that the rule is already contained in the human brain and the examples
have the only effect of selecting the good rule among all the admissible ones.
The opposite point of view (Aristotle) claims that the problem is ill posed and
that human brain is tabula rasa before the experience of the external world.
Plato’s point of view has been often dismissed as idealistic and non-scientific.
Here we want to suggest that this is not the case and that Platonic ideas are correct,
at least in a slightly different contest. Indeed the possibility of having machines which
learn rules from examples has been the subject of intensive investigations in recent
years [?]. A very interesting question is to understand under which conditions the
machine is able to generalize from examples, i.e. to learn the whole rule knowing
only a few applications of the rule. The main conclusion we want to reach is that a
given machine cannot learn an arbitrary rule and the set of rules that can be easily be
learned may be determined by analyzing the architecture of the machine. Learning
by example consists in selecting the correct rule among those contained in this set.
Let us see in the next sections how it may happen and how complexity is related to
intelligence.
5 Learning, generalization and propensities
In order to see how this selectionist principle may work let us start with some def-
inition. In the following I will consider rules which assign to each input vector of
N Boolean variables (σi = 0 or 1 for i = 1, N) an output which consists of a single
Boolean value. In other words a rule is a Boolean valued function defined on a set
of 2N elements (i.e. the set of all the possible values of the variables σ; it will be
denoted by R[σ]).
The rule may be specified either by some analytic formulae or by explicitly stating
the output for all the possible inputs. The number of different rules increases very
fast with N : it is given by 22
N
≡ 2NI , where NI is the number of different possible
input vectors, i.e. 2N . In the following we will always consider N to be a large
number: terms proportional to 1/N will be neglected.
A learning machine is fully specified if we know its architecture and the learning
algorithm.
Le us firstly define the architecture of the machine. We suppose that the compu-
tations that the machine performs depend on M Boolean variables (Jk, k = 1,M). In
the nutshell the architecture is a Boolean function A[σ, , J ], which gives the response
2Two examples: (a) the horsiness is not the property of any given horse or set of horses (b) there are
many different mathematical rules that generate the same sequence.
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of machine to the input σ’s for each choice of the control parameters J ’s. Typical
architectures are the perceptron [?] or a neural network, with discretized synaptic
couplings.
For each given rule R and choice of J ’s, the machine may make some errors with
respect to the rule R. The total number of errors (E[R, J ]) depends on the rule R
and on the J ’s; it is given by
E[R, J ] =
∑
{σ}
(R[σ]−A[σ, J ])2 . (4)
For a given architecture the machine may learn the rule R without errors if and
only if is there exist a set of J ’s such that E[R, J ] = 0 . Simple counting arguments
tell us that there are rules which cannot be learned without errors, if M is smaller
that 2N . In most of the cases 2N is extremely larger than M and therefore the
number of admissible rules is an extraordinary tiny fraction of all the possible rules.
In a learning session we give to the machine the information on the values of
R[σ] for L instances in the σ’s (L is generally much smaller than 2N ). A learning
algorithm tries to find the J ’s which minimize the error on these L instances 3 Let
us denote by J∗ the J ’s found by the learning algorithm.
If the error on the other 2N−L instances has decreased as effect of having learned
the first L instances, we say that the machine is able to generalize, at least to a
certain extent. Perfect generalization is achieved when no error is done on the other
2N−L instances.
For a given machine the propensity to generalize depends on the rule and not
all rules will be generalized by the machine. Our aim is to understand how the
propensity to learn different rules changes when we change the machine; in this note
we are only interested in the effect of changing the architecture.
It was suggested by Carnevali and Patarnello in a remarkable paper [?] that, if we
suppose that the learning algorithm is quite efficient, the propensity of the machine
to generalize a given rule (pR) depends only on the architecture. The propensity (pR)
may be approximated by the number of different control parameters J for which the
total number of errors is zero.
In other words we define the propensity as
pR = 2
−M
∑
{J}
δ(E[R, J ]) , (5)
where E[R, J ] is given by eq. (1) and obviously depends only on the architecture.
The function δ is defined is such a way that δ(k) = 1 for k = 0 , δ(k) = 0 for k 6= 0 .
3There are many different learning algorithm and some are faster than others. The choice of the learning
algorithm is very important for practical purposes, but we will not investigate this point anymore.
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According to Carnevali and Patarnello, rules with very small propensity cannot
be generalized, while rules with higher propensity will be easier to generalize. In
their approach the propensity of a given architecture in generalizing is summarized
by the values of the function pR for all the 2
NI arguments (the pR’s depend only on
the architecture, not by the learning algorithms). Of course the propensity cannot
be directly related to the number of examples needed to learn a rule, a more detailed
analysis, taking care of the relevance of the presented example, must be done.
6 A statistical approach to propensities
Our aim is to use statistical mechanics techniques [?] to study in details the properties
of pR.
The pR are normalized to 1 (
∑
R pR = 1) and it is natural to introduce the entropy
of the algorithm A:
S[A] = −
∑
R
pR ln(pR). (6)
The entropy S[A] is a non negative number smaller or equal than ln(2)min(2N ,M).
We could say that if the entropy is finite for large N , the machine is able to
represent essentially a finite number of rules, while, if the entropy is too large, too
many rules are acceptable.
As an example we study the entropy of the perceptron (without hidden unity).
In this case (for N = M odd) a detailed computation shows that all the 2N choices
of the J ′s lead to different rules (i.e. two different J ’s produce a different output at
least in one case) and therefore S[A] = ln(2)N .
We note that we could generalize the previous definition of entropy by introducing
a partition function Z(β) defined as follows
Z(β) =
∑
R
exp(β ln(pR)) =
∑
R
pβR. (7)
We could introduce the entropy S(β) associated with the partition function [?]
(S(β) ≡ dln[Z(β)/β]/dβ). The previous defined entropy (eq. 6) coincides with
S(1).
The value of the entropy as function of β tells us which is the the probability
distribution of the p′Rs. There are many unsolved question whose answer depend on
the model: existence of phase transitions, structure of the states at low temperature,
breaking of the replica symmetry . . .
Many additional questions may be posed if we consider more than one architec-
ture; in particular we would like to find out properties which distinguish between
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architectures which have similar entropies. For example we could consider two dif-
ferent architectures (i.e. a layered perceptron or a symmetric neural network) with
N inputs and one output which have the same entropy (this can be achieved for
example by adjusting the number of internal layers or hidden neurons). It is natural
to ask if these two different architectures are able to generalize the same rules, or if
their propensity to generalize is concentrated on rules of quite different nature. Our
aim is to define a distance between two architectures, which will help us to compare
the different performances.
Let us consider two architectures A and B. A first step may consist in defining
the entropy of B relative to A as
S[B/A] = −
∑
R
pR(A) ln[pR(B)/pR(A)] . (8)
It can be shown that S[B/A] is a non-negative quantity that becomes zero if and
only if pR(A) = pR(B). The relative entropy is not symmetric and we can define the
distance (or better the difference) between A and B as
d(A,B) = 1/2S[B/A] + S[A/B] . (9)
The introduction of a distance allow us to find out if two different architectures with
the same generalization propensity; do they generalize the same rules or the rules
they are able to generalize are different? Unfortunately, the explicit computation of
the distance among two architectures may be very long and difficult.
A very interesting and less understood question is how many examples are needed
to specify the rule for a given architecture. The result obviously depend on the
architecture (people with an high value of serendipity guess the write rule after a few
examples) and explicit computations are very difficult, if we exclude rather simples
cases.
7 A possible definition of intelligence
Having in our hands a definition of the distance between two architectures, we can
now come to a more speculative question: how to define the intelligence of an archi-
tecture. A possibility consists in defining an architecture I(σ, J), which is the most
intelligent by definition; the intelligence of A can be defined as −d[A, I]/S[A] (the
factor S[A]has been introduced for normalization purposes). The definition of the
intelligent architecture I is the real problem.
We suggest that a sequence of the most intelligent architectures is provided by a
Turing machine (roughly speaking a general purpose computer) with infinite amount
of time for the computation with a code of length L. More precisely the J ’s are the L
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bits of a code for the Turing machine (written in a given language) which uses the σ
as inputs. The function I(σ, J) is 1, if the program coded by J stops after some time,
and it is 0, if the the program never stops. With this architecture we can compute
the function s(R) (i.e. the simplicity of a rule) [?], defined as s(R) ≡ pR(I).
It may be possible to estimate the function s(R) using the relation s(R) ≈ 2−Σ(R),
where Σ(R) is the algorithmic complexity (introduced in the first section) i.e. the
length of the shortest codes which computes the function R[σ].
If we would like to know the intelligence of an architecture A with entropy S,
we should consider a Turing machine with nearly the same entropy and we should
compute the distance between the two architectures.
The previous observations imply that algorithms which compute the rule in a
relatively short time are likely unable to implement many rules with low algorithmic
complexity and high logical depth. In many of the most common algorithms the
number of operations needed to compute the output for a given input is proportional
to a power of N . For other algorithms (e.g. an asymmetric neural network, in which
we require the computation of a limiting cycle) the computer time needed may be
much larger (e.g. proportional to 2L). It is natural to suppose that this last class of
algorithms will be more intelligent than the previous one and will learn more easily
rules with low algorithmic complexity and high logical depth [?].
The puzzled reader may ask: if a general purpose computer is the most intelligent
architecture, while people are studying and proposing for practical applications less
intelligent architectures likes neural networks? A possible answer is that this defi-
nition of intelligence may be useful to disembodied entities that have an unbound
amount of time at their disposal. If we have to find a rule and take a decision in real
time (one second or one century, it does not matter, what matters is that the time
is limited) rules of too low complexity and very large logical depth are completely
useless; moreover a computer can be used to define the intelligence but we have seen
that a computer is not well suited for finding and executing intelligent rules. The
requirement of taking a fast decision may be dramatic in some case, e.g. when you
meet a lion on your path; evolution definitely prefer sa living donkey to a dead doctor
and it quite likely that we have not been selected for learning rules with too large
logical depth.
There are also other possible inconveniences with rules with too low complexity,
i.e. they may be unstable with the respect of a small variation of the data they have
to reproduce. It is quite possible that the shortest program that pronounce words
in Italian may have a completely different structure of the shortest program that
pronounces words in Spanish, in spite of the similarity of the two languages. We
would like to have a program that may be used for many languages, where we can
add a new language without changing too much the core of the program; it is quite
likely that such a program would be much longer than the shortest one for a given
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set of rules. Strong optimization and plasticity are complementary requirements. For
example the nervous system of insects is extremely optimized and quite likely it is
able to perform the tasks with a minimal number of neurons, but it certain lacks the
plasticity of mammalian nervous system.
Architectures that are different from a general purpose computer may realize a
compromise producing rules that have low, but not too low complexity and high, but
not to high logical depth. Moreover these architectures are specialized: some of them
(like neural networks) may be very good in working as associative memories but quite
bad in doing arithmetics. The problem of finding the architecture that works in the
most efficient way for a given task is difficult and fascinating and in many cases (e.g.
reconstructing three dimensional objects from two dimensional images) it has also a
very important practical impact.
I hope that this short exposition has convinced the reader of the correctness of
the point of view that learning from example can be done only selecting among
already existing rules. This is what typically happens in biology in many cases. The
genetic information only preselect a large class of behavior and the external stimulus
select the behavior among the available ones. This procedure can be seen in action
in the immune systems. The number of possible different antibodies is extremely
high (O(10100)); each given individual at a given moment produces a much smaller
number of different antibody (e.g. O(108)). The external antigen select the most
active antibodies among those present in the actual repertoire and stimulate their
production. Eldeman has stressed that it is quite natural that a similar process
happens also in the brain as far as learning is concerned .
In conclusion at the present moment we have only started our exploration of the
properties of rules that are implicitly defined by an architecture. I am convinced that
the future will bring us many interesting results in this direction. It is amazing in
how diverse directions Kolmogorov’s ideas are relevant and find an application.
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